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RECENT DECISIONS
ment of two people (Miss Mapp and Mr. Linkletter) in identical situa-
tions should be merely a function of the efficiency of a state's judicial
system, as Mr. Justice Black's dissent points out."6 As well-founded as
all of these arguments are, however, it must be borne in mind that the
problem confronting the Court was a serious one, and the pragmatic
considerations concerning the administrative side of the judicial system
alone go far toward meeting the critics' arguments. Also, although one
may say that this decision breaks precedent, it must be remembered that
in this area of the law there is ample historical background stretching
over hundreds of years for doing so." Finally, a decision in a case like this
is composed of a large amount of value judgment, which makes it ame-
nable to the barbs of criticism. This particular decision, though, is favored
with a thorough logical and historical style and composition that, upon
reflection, make it much easier for the reader to fully understand the
thought-process of Mr. Justice Clark and the full import of what he is
trying to convey. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the decision, and thus the
starting-point for most of the criticism, is that its pragmatic aspect has
the very unpragmatic effect of keeping the jails full while attempting to
keep the courts empty. While this is deplorable in many respects, one
cannot quarrel with the Court's desire to be of assistance to an already
overworked judiciary, nor can one fail to realize that in this area of con-
stitutional development the Supreme Court is experiencing somewhat
rapid and far-reaching changes, the material effect of which must also be
dealt with. While the decision may appear to fly in the face of "what is
right," the nature and importance of the question and the scrupulously
correct means used to decide it are such as to blunt the arguments of its
opponents upon a fair legal appraisal of all that is involved.
Samuel J. Pasquarelli
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Right to Counsel-The United States Supreme
Court, in making an accused's right to confront witnesses a fundamental
right applicable to the states, unnecessarily extended constitutional law.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965).
In April of this year, the Supreme Court of the United States in Pointer
v. Texas' rendered a decision which resulted in the application of another
constitutional provision to the states. Now, the right of an accused to
confront witnesses against him can be enforced in any state court as
well as in the federal courts.
16. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 2, at 1744.
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, CO JNTARims.69 (15th ed. 1809).
1. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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The petitioner and one Dillard were arrested in Texas on a charge of
having robbed one Phillips "by assault or violence, or by putting in fear
of bodily injury."2 At the preliminary hearing, the principal witness for
the State was the victim, Phillips. Neither of the defendants had counsel
at this hearing. Both, however, had the right to cross-examine any wit-
nesses brought in by the State. The petitioner did not try to cross-examine
Phillips, and was subsequently indicted on the charge. Before the trial
began, Phillips moved out of the state with no intention of returning.
Since Phillips was not present at the trial, the State offered the transcript
of his testimony given at the preliminary hearing as evidence against the
petitioner. The evidence was admitted and bore heavily in petitioner's
conviction. The conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Without deciding the question raised by petitioner, i.e. denial of
counsel,4 the Supreme Court held that the use of the transcript of a
witness' testimony at a preliminary hearing in which petitioner was not
represented by counsel was a denial of his sixth amendment right to con-
front and to cross-examine through counsel the witnesses against him.
In reversing the conviction, the Court applied this right to the states,
holding:
S. . that the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront
the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Without considering the validity of the Court's view concerning the
right of confrontation or the present trend in their decision-making, it
is easily discernable that there existed a more rational approach to this
case, one which would not have violated the Court's long-settled policy
of refraining from deciding constitutional questions unless absolutely
necessary.' This case could have been decided on the grounds that the
State of Texas had denied the petitioner his right to counsel as guaranteed
him by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.7 The Court paid very little
attention to this aspect of the case, claiming that the time when the
petitioner was without counsel was not a "critical stage" in the case. The
Court reasoned that since under Texas criminal procedure the preliminary
hearing served only to decide whether or not the accused should be held
for the grand jury and, if so, whether he should be admitted to bail, this
2. TFxAs PENrAL CODE art. 1408.
3. 375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App., 1965).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Pointer v. Texas, supra note 1, at 403.
6. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 4; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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proceeding was not of such urgency as to warrant the presence of counsel.,
The Court further stated that only when the stage in a criminal case
becomes critical, as when a proceeding calls for or accepts a plea of
guilty or not guilty, then the failure to appoint counsel to represent the
accused would be denial of his right to counsel. This view is utterly
inconsistent with the Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois,10 where
the Court held that:
where... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incrim-
inating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have
not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel. ... "I'
If the Court in Escobedo felt that when the police have a suspect the
time is critical enough for the right to counsel to attach, why is an official
criminal proceeding of a state court not likewise critical? In the Texas
preliminary hearing, the petitioner was accused by a witness and by the
State of being the perpetrator of a crime. Surely, the investigation into
the crime had ceased to be "investigatory" and had become "accusatory."
Then, since the petitioner was without counsel at this time, there was a
violation of his right to have the "assistance of counsel."
The one disadvantage of the argument raised here is that Escobedo,
as cited above, calls for a request by the defendant for counsel. From the
Record in Pointer, there was no request by the petitioner. Since not all
laymen know of their constitutional rights, would it not have been a
more rational approach to settling this case, and a more logical extension
of constitutional law to eliminate the need for a "request for counsel"
than for the Court to have unnecessarily imposed another constitutional
provision upon the states?
Ronald H. Heck
8. Pointer v. Texas, supra note 1.
9. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
10. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 7.
11. Id. at 490, 491.
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